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The Effect of National and Constituency 
Expectations on Tactical Voting in the  
British General Election of 2010
Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Abraham Diskin, 
Aaron M. Houck, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto,  
and David B. Sparks
The 2010 elections in the United Kingdom provided voters with numer-
ous and diverse opportunities to reason strategically. The Liberal Demo-
crats (Lib Dems)— traditionally finishing a distant third in terms of seats 
in Parliament— vied with Labour to be the principal competition to the 
Conservatives, who failed to win a majority of seats, creating a rare case of 
what the British call a hung parliament.1 These conditions varied across 
constituencies at the district level, and we exploit this variation to study 
the incidence of “tactical” voting. But the national outcome also presented 
strategic considerations for voters, and these conditions varied to some 
extent over the course of the campaign, giving voters interviewed at differ-
ent times different sets of national considerations for tactical voting. This 
presents us with the opportunity to investigate how both local and national 
considerations may shape strategic reasoning among voters and relate to 
each other and to the final choices of voters on Election Day.
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The Problem
Statement
The logic of strategic voting, developed in detail in chapter 1, is simple. 
Strategic voters seek to use their votes to shape the outcome, if at all pos-
sible, rather than to “simply” express their preferences.2 If voters value 
their votes in terms of affecting collective outcomes, they will avoid “wast-
ing” their votes on candidates with no chance of winning. More precisely, 
strategic voters will cast their votes for the candidate who maximizes the 
expected utility, which is a product of the utility they derive from the can-
didate’s winning and their expectations that their votes will be pivotal for 
the candidate’s victory. Though all voters may be strategic and make such 
calculations, only a subset of the electorate faces a strategic context that 
compels them to be “tactical” voters— that is, voters who deviate from 
voting for their most preferred candidate or party. Decades of study have 
confirmed the empirical manifestation of strategic voting, especially in 
observing the regularity of tactical voting under the theoretically predicted 
circumstances. Particularly in “first past the post” (FPTP) electoral systems 
(but also in other electoral systems, including proportional representation), 
candidates expected to lose the race tend to lose supporters who cast tacti-
cal votes for less preferred but more viable candidates (see, e.g., Abramson 
et al. 2010; Riera 2016).
The apparent simplicity of the calculus of voting obscures understudied 
complications to the practice of strategic voting, even in the fairly clear 
strategic considerations presented in modern Westminster systems. Voters 
in such systems cast ballots only for local candidates, but in the aggregate 
their votes determine which party or parties form(s) the national govern-
ment. Thus, such strategic voters may be expected to choose among the 
candidates with these dual considerations in mind. It would be surprising, 
for example, if voters’ opinions about prime ministerial candidates failed 
to enter their thinking, and there is evidence that expectations about the 
national outcome also shape their understanding of the strategic context 
of the campaign. This may be no surprise, because media coverage of elec-
tions focuses heavily on the national race, meaning that voters have good 
information to develop national- level expectations,3 while the amount and 
quality of information available to develop constituency- level expectations 
is varied and often of low quality. In sum, a voter’s strategic context is deter-
mined by both national- and constituency- level expectations and prefer-
ences, and it is a testable question as to how they shape voting behavior.
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Data
We evaluate this approach using data collected from individual Eng-
lish respondents during the 2010 British election campaign. This elec-
tion provides a particularly valuable empirical test of the national- and 
constituency- level components of strategic voting. First, if it is correct to 
rely solely on constituency- level information in calculating tactical voting, 
the 2010 UK contest constitutes a strong test of the assumption, as it is a 
case where voters who might rely on national- level information concern-
ing various parties’ realistic chances of forming a government should have 
been more reluctant than usual to vote tactically, at least for a good part of 
the campaign. The 2010 election was typical in that there was very little 
chance that any one party would win an outright majority of the votes. But 
the 2010 election was atypical in that for the first time in many years, the 
heretofore perennial third- place- finishing Lib Dems were, for at least a 
short while during the campaign, statistically tied with and possibly even 
ahead of Labour in the public opinion polls and thus in second place. At 
that point, according to the theory of strategic voting, no vote for any of 
the three parties would be wasted. The viability of the Lib Dems became 
particularly apparent following the first debate on April 15, three weeks 
prior to the election. An unexpectedly strong performance by Lib Dem 
party leader Nick Clegg resulted in the party’s brief surge toward the top 
of the polls. Clegg’s and the Lib Dems’ chances subsequently declined, but 
they ended up in a governing coalition with the plurality- winning Conser-
vatives. Even so, voters reported taking tactical votes away from the Lib 
Dems, as would be the tactical choice in most British elections since World 
War II.
Second, the 2010 British Election Study (BES) provides an ideal dataset 
to explore the phenomena of tactical voting at the national and local levels. 
More than 7,000 respondents in England were asked to provide evalua-
tions of the three main parties as well as an estimate along two 11- point 
(0– 10) scales of the likelihood of the parties’ winning the national elec-
tion and the local seat. These data allow us to estimate and analyze voters’ 
individual expected- utility calculations using their own expectations rather 
than relying on external (and in the case of local races, infrequent) poll 
results. We can also then aggregate these individual choices to examine 
the overall occurrence of tactical voting. The dynamics of the campaign 
itself— especially the Lib Dems’ surge and decline in the polls— provides 
variation in respondents’ expectations, which allows us to better test our 
theoretical predictions.
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Third, the United Kingdom has been one of the primary locations for 
the empirical study of strategic and tactical voting. Evidence of tactical vot-
ing has been found in a variety of voting systems, including runoff systems 
and proportional representation (Abramson et al. 2010; Riera 2016). But 
many scholars expect that tactical voting should be most common in FPTP 
systems like that of the United Kingdom (for early tests, see Black 1978; 
Blais and Carty 1991; Cain 1978). And with a virtually unitary government, 
the single vote cast for a candidate for the House of Commons is the basis 
for determining that nearly unitary government.
These effects are magnified in the United Kingdom because what 
Duverger (1959) referred to as the “mechanical effect” of single- member 
districts that has translated a plurality winner in terms of votes into a 
majority winner in terms of seats in the great majority of elections since 
World War II, thus both justifying and magnifying his “psychological 
effect.” Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between vote and seat pro-
portions in British general elections since 1945. The top two lines show 
how the plurality- winning party (either the Conservatives or Labour) won 
a higher percentage of seats than votes and how that result frequently 
translated a sub- 50% vote share into a single- party majority in Parliament, 
thus indicating the relevance of the mechanical effect. The two lower lines 
show how that legislative seat bonus came at the expense of the third- place 
party (always the Lib Dems or their predecessors), which has consistently 
received a smaller percentage (and often a much smaller percentage) of 
seats than of votes.4 If anything, the seats/vote splits for the Lib Dems 
appear to be growing farther apart over time, suggesting that the mechani-
cal effect, as Duverger proposed, has been supplemented and strengthened 
by the psychological effect, revealed as tactical voting. That is, it appears 
that a significant number of voters abandon the Lib Dems in districts 
where they have little chance of winning. And, if anything, it appears that 
over time voters are learning when to avoid “wasting” their vote.5
Scholars have shown that in recent British elections, a significant subset 
of the electorate who preferred electorally unviable parties voted consis-
tent with the logic of tactical voting based on their understanding that the 
FPTP system would deny their preferred party representation. Evidence of 
tactical voting has been found in the British elections of 1970 (Cain 1978), 
1977 (Fieldhouse, Shryane, and Pickles 2007), 1983 (Fisher 2004; Franklin, 
Niemi, and Whitten 1994; Heath et al. 1991; Lanoue and Bowler 1992; 
Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992), 1987 (Heath et al. 1991; Heath and 
Evans 1994; Lanoue and Bowler 1992), 1992 (Fisher 2004), 1997 (Fisher 
2004; Myatt and Fisher 2002), 2001 (Clarke et al. 2004; Fieldhouse, Shry-
Fig. 2.1. Seat and Vote Percentages, First- and Third- Place Parties, UK 
Elections, 1945– 2010
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ane, and Pickles 2007; Fisher and Curtice 2006), and 2005 (Fisher and 
Curtice 2006; Kiewiet 2013).
The Theory of Strategic and Tactical Voting,  
with Two Modifications
The Standard or Classical Model of Strategic Voting
The theory of strategic voting has been formalized by scholars examining 
the “calculus of voting” (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972). Under this the-
ory, voters maximize the expected utility of their votes calculated by mul-
tiplying the voter’s utility from that candidate’s winning by the expectation 
that the vote will be pivotal or decisive. Thus citizens’ vote choices are a 
function of both their preferences among the candidates and their expecta-
tions about the election outcome. We will thus consider two utility order-
ings of candidates: a simple or pure utility ordering that considers only 
preferences (that is, “sincere” preferences) and an expected- utility ordering 
that combines preferences with expectations. When the two orderings dif-
fer and when an expected- utility- maximizing voter votes for the candidate 
at the top of the expected- utility ordering instead of the candidate at the 
top of the ordering based purely on preferences, we say that the voter is 
voting tactically.
Because tactical voting applies only to supporters of trailing candidates, 
many strategic voters will still vote for their most preferred party. In a three- 
party local race, the two parties with the greatest chance of winning will, 
by definition, be the first choice of at least two- thirds of the electorate (and 
typically will be favored by more than two- thirds), assuming that all voters 
have reasonably accurate expectations about the campaign. Consequently, 
no fewer than two- thirds of the voters in each constituency should vote for 
the party or candidate they most prefer whether for sincere or strategic 
reasons. The exception to this “straightforward” strategy occurs only in 
the narrow circumstances described by Kselman and Niou (2010), when 
the second- most- preferred party is seen as more likely than the most- 
preferred party to defeat the least favorite party (see chapter 1).
Testable Hypotheses Drawn from the Classical Model
There are many empirical tests of the strategic voting model, particularly 
using data from the United Kingdom. The best of these tests are based 
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on testable hypotheses that flow from the classical model of the multican-
didate calculus of voting. We draw here from Kselman and Niou (2010; 
see also Niou 2001), who emphasize the drawing of empirically testable 
hypotheses from the strategic calculus. Their work helps to sharpen our 
theoretical understanding of this well- documented phenomenon. Their 
formal model of voting in a three- party FPTP system, for example, dem-
onstrates that tactical voting can occur only when the voter’s second- most- 
preferred candidate is more likely to win than the favorite candidate.6 We 
extend their hypotheses to cover both national and local strategic consid-
erations, thereby providing a novel mechanism for sorting constituency- 
and national- level incentives for tactical voting. We find strong support 
for our conclusions that both levels of incentives help to explain variation 
in the patterns of tactical voting across England and that voters’ individual 
strategic considerations vary according to informational and viability con-
texts. Before we develop this empirical model, we first introduce our two 
modifications.
Two Modifications of the Classical Model
We believe that voters are influenced by strategic considerations. We also 
believe that the rigidity and determinism of the “classic” statement of the 
calculus of voting in multicandidate contests needs to be relaxed some-
what, much as the behavioral revolution in economics has relaxed par-
ticular assumptions of the rigid, classical rationality model. We propose a 
weakening of two assumptions to the strict, standard model.
First, in any expected- utility model, the estimated probability of an out-
come is assumed to be known with certainty. We imagine instead that vot-
ers are uncertain about this number— that is, they act as if their reported 
likelihood were the mean of a subjective probability distribution. We 
assume, therefore, that there is a stochastic term associated with the prob-
ability terms, reflecting that uncertainty. In practice, we use this assump-
tion solely to assert that voters do not have deterministic expected- utility 
values for the casting of votes for party x rather than y but rather have an 
expected value with variance reflecting uncertainty.
The second weakening of the standard calculus is that voters’ estimates 
of closeness draw from the full campaign— that is, their expectations about 
outcomes are derived from information that might be available about races 
at both the local and the national levels. Further, voters care not only who 
their local MP will be but also which party or parties form the govern-
ment and who becomes prime minister. Indeed, both are found empirically 
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to be important independent determinates of voters’ choices (see Blais et 
al. 2006 on coalitions; Bean and Mughan 1989 on prime ministerial can-
didates). National effects enter the strategic vote in two ways. One way 
is fully within the model: the classical model includes national closeness 
but does so only interactively. A voter might vote strategically if the cir-
cumstances are correct in the constituency, just as usual. Empirically, this 
would show up as voting strategically based on preferences regarding the 
local candidates and/or their parties and the closeness of the vote in the 
constituency. There would be no effect of national closeness on the vote. If 
the national conditions are also ripe for casting a strategic vote, then this 
would show up— and in the classic model would only show up— when it is 
simultaneously appropriate to vote strategically in the constituency and in 
the nation.7 Our relaxation of the classic model says that preferences might 
have a modest direct effect on preferences about the national outcome and 
closeness at the national level. This is not surprising if there is some varia-
tion in citizens’ calculations about closeness in the local electoral district. A 
Bayesian subjective probability distribution of outcomes would have some 
probability of a close outcome happening locally even when the occasional 
polls and conventional accounting of the local race point to that probably 
being very small. But even a very small probability can sustain a (small) 
effect on the national race, even when a voter thinks a close race locally is 
unlikely. Voters may hedge their bets by voting based on national consid-
erations “just in case” (and contrary to what they believe is most likely) the 
local race turns out to be competitive and thus relevant for national seat 
totals. While this model would formally result from an interaction between 
local and national effects, our data (indeed all existing data of which we are 
aware) do not give us sufficient information about the (assumed) subjec-
tive probability distribution of local outcomes to observe this interaction. 
Instead, it would show up empirically as a (modest) apparently direct effect 
of a national basis for a strategic voter’s casting of a tactical vote.
These two modifications are based on the notion that voters may make 
what they believe to be strategic decisions in an environment of incom-
plete information. Existing research (e.g., Blais and Bodet 2006; Blais and 
Turgeon 2004; Lanoue and Bowler 1998; Murr 2013) finds that at the 
national level, polls are a key driver in how voters perceive the competi-
tiveness of the overall election, while at the local level, voters rely on cues 
such as (and perhaps especially) incumbency to make their decisions con-
cerning candidate viabilities in the constituencies.8 Thus, voters may have 
more confidence in their national- level expectations and take that greater 
certainty into account when deciding how to vote.
36 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
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These ideas lead to two empirical implications. First, it is appropriate 
from the strategic voters’ perspective to have a stochastic term in the esti-
mation with respect to subjective estimates of probabilities of outcomes. 
That is, while empirical estimations always have such a stochastic term, it is 
justified as a consequence of sampling error. We assume that this is inher-
ent in the choice process itself.9 Second, people care about the national 
outcome as well as the local one— that is, they care about what govern-
ment will form, who will lead it, and perhaps other features of the national 
election. This means that a strategic voter considers both the national and 
local races. Empirically, if this is true, we should expect at least a modest 
interaction effect, as one can be decisive nationally only if one is also deci-
sive locally, and the effect is likely modest, because the probability of being 
decisive nationally is much smaller than locally, ceteris paribus. Under our 
first modifying assumption, we would observe a direct effect of national 
closeness— likely a very much weaker effect, as it may appear to be a direct 
effect primarily because the voter who said the election was not likely to be 
close locally nonetheless is assumed to have a small but still positive prob-
ability of it being close.
Empirical Tests of the Theory of Strategic Voting
We test a theory of strategic voting that predicts that voters will cast their 
votes for the candidate who maximizes their expected utility, where utility 
is derived from both the local and the national outcomes (that is, who wins 
the district and who forms the government). Our theory implies a series of 
testable hypotheses.
We derive our first set of hypotheses about strategic voting in the 
aggregate. These predictions rely on a relatively weak set of assumptions 
about the data- generating process, requiring only ordinal data about vot-
ers’ preferences and expectations. Our second set of hypotheses is the 
consequence of assuming fuller information about the strategic context at 
the microlevel of the individual. This model makes stronger assumptions 
about the measurement of individual voters’ cardinal preferences regard-
ing candidates and expectations about the election outcomes but yields a 
larger and stronger set of implications.
We use survey data from the BES to explore the incidence of tactical 
voting in the 2010 British General Election.10 We limited our analysis to 
respondents from English constituencies and to those who reported a vote 
intention for one of the three major parties.11 Each respondent’s preferences 
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over the three major parties is determined by comparing the feeling ther-
mometer scores given each party.12 Respondents’ preference rankings of the 
parties are compared with their reported vote intention. The reported inten-
tion of tactical voters will deviate from their “sincere” preferences: that is, 
they will report an intention to vote for their second choice instead of their 
most preferred candidate.13 We used the comparison between preferences 
and intended votes to create two new variables, topvote and secondvote for each 
respondent. The variable topvote is a dichotomous indicator of whether a 
respondent reports an intention to vote for the most preferred party. The 
variable secondvote is similarly a dichotomous indicator of whether a respon-
dent intends to vote for the second- most- preferred party, and it serves as the 
key dependent variable in the hypotheses and analyses.14
The BES included a question asking respondents about the rationale 
behind their vote intention. Two of the available responses implicated tac-
tical considerations: “I really prefer another party, but it stands no chance 
of winning,” and “I vote tactically.” Of the respondents who indicated an 
intention to vote for their second- most- preferred party, 61.4% chose one 
of those two responses.15 Among all other voters, only 9.8% (708 of 7,257 
respondents) chose one of those two responses.16 This suggests that our 
secondvote variable provides a good indication tactical voting.
Macrolevel Hypotheses
Our first test of the model of strategic voting describes how we expect 
tactical voting to vary by strategic context in the aggregate using the less 
demanding information from our survey respondents. Like Kselman and 
Niou (2010), we consider respondents’ personal assessments (preferences 
and expectations) of the various parties and then identify these assessments 
by the individual’s preference ordering of the parties (rather than by, say, 
party name). Thus for one voter, the Conservatives might be the most pre-
ferred party (Party 1), and for another voter, the Conservatives might be 
Party 3 (that voter’s third choice— i.e., least favorite party). We can then 
identify each voter’s strategic context by listing whom the voter expects to 
come in first, second, and third. Thus, a voter with a strategic context of 
(1,2,3) faces a situation in which the favorite party has the best chance of 
winning, the second choice has the second- best chance of winning, and the 
least- favorite party has the worst chance of winning, while (2,1,3) denotes 
the case where the second- choice party is expected to win, the first choice 
is expected to come in second, and the third- ranked party is expected to 
come in third place in the vote.17
38 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
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Kselman and Niou (2010) consider a three- party contest in one single- 
member district. They prove that of the six possible combinations of 
expected order of finish among the ranked parties,18 only three provide a 
voter with any incentive to vote tactically for their second- choice party— 
those in which the voter’s second- choice party is expected to have a greater 
likelihood of winning than the voter’s first- choice party. That is, tactical 
voting is a theoretical possibility only for orderings (2,1,3), (3,2,1), and 
(2,3,1), and if a voter with an ordering of (1,2,3), (1,3,2), or (3,1,2) votes for 
the second- choice party, it must be for reasons other than strategic consid-
erations. Kselman and Niou note that among the three scenarios in which 
tactical voting is possible, the conditions under which it is a possibility are 
narrower for ordering (2,1,3) than for either (2,3,1) or (3,2,1). Based only 
on the theoretical work of Kselman and Niou, one could place the various 
possible orderings of three parties into three categories based on incen-
tives to tactically vote for a second- choice party. The (1,2,3), (1,3,2), and 
(3,1,2) orderings would be classified as providing zero incentive; the (2,1,3) 
ordering would be classified as having weaker incentives; and the (2,3,1) 
and (3,2,1) orderings would be classified as having stronger incentives. But 
given our behavioral assumptions about voters’ probability estimates— 
that is, our inclusion of a stochastic term allowing for possible errors in 
estimating the parties’ likelihood of winning— even the zero incentive 
ordering includes some possible (albeit minimal) incentive for tactical vot-
ing. Accordingly, we adjust our three categories of incentives to minimal, 
moderate, and strongest. The “minimal” class thus includes (1,2,3), (1,3,2) 
and (3,1,2); the “moderate” class includes (2,1,3); and the “strongest” class 
includes (2,1,3) and (2,3,1).
But these three categories— like the work of Kselman and Niou— 
consider only the case of a single district. In empirical cases, the single dis-
trict is embedded in the national contest, and as in the United Kingdom, 
it is possible to imagine casting the decisive vote in the district and in the 
nation. With perfect knowledge of the true probabilities, one cannot cast 
a decisive vote in the nation unless one does so at the district level too.19 
However, with any uncertainty about the true probabilities, the assumption 
about subjective probability distributions means that there is some nonzero 
probability of being decisive, no matter what the most likely case may be. 
(That is, even voters who think that they will not be decisive at the local level 
have a nonzero probability of being so.) Thus, there may be a small prob-
ability of casting a decisive vote in the nation but not the district, at least 
in terms of how voters respond to the survey questions asked. The result of 
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adding the national level is that the table is now three- by- three. We applied 
the formal logic of Kselman and Niou to this case (it flowing obviously, 
given their original results) with one exception. By assumption, the national 
effect is necessarily small, unless it interacts with a genuine incentive to 
cast a tactical vote locally. That is, we build into the model our assumption 
that tactical voting nationally requires interaction with the local conditions, 
whereas the reverse is not true. Voters have incentives to vote tactically in 
the district based only the strategic circumstances in that district, no matter 
the national conditions. This results in the three- by- three array reported 
in table 2.1, where the entries denote our extension of the Kselman- Niou 
formal derivations. The numbers in the cells reflect our expected ranking 
of each of the nine cells in terms of the likelihood (and thus incidence) 
of tactical voting. Thus, the bottom- right cell, in which voters would face 
the strongest incentives at both the local and national levels, is assigned a 
1, because we would expect those voters to have the highest incentives to 
vote tactically. The 2 cell— in which voters still face the strongest incen-
tives at the local level but only moderate incentives at the national level— is 
directly above cell 1 because our theory suggests that constituency- level 
incentives will dominate national- level incentives. The three lowest- rated 
cells— those labeled 7, 8, and 9— all come in the first column of the table, 
where the constituency- level incentives are minimal, but within this column 
the incentives fall along with the national- level incentives.
TABLE 2.1. Theoretical Expectations of 
Incentives to Deviate from First Preference by 
National- and Constituency- Level Expectations
Constituency
Minimal
(1,2,3),  
(1,3,2),  
(3,1,2)
Moderate
(2,1,3) 
Strongest
(2,3,1),  
(3,2,1) 
N
at
io
na
l
Minimal
(1,2,3), 
(1,3,2), 
(3,1,2)
9 6 3
Moderate
(2,1,3)
8 5 2
Strongest
(2,3,1), 
(3,2,1)
7 4 1 
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Taken together, two hypotheses concerning voter preferences and party 
viabilities follow from our extension of Kselman and Niou’s framework to 
differentiate between perceived competitiveness at the national and con-
stituency levels:
H1. Tactical voting across the respondents as a whole will conform 
to the relative ordering described in table 2.1. That is, the inci-
dence of secondvote equaling 1 will be lowest for the cell labeled 9 
and highest for the cell labeled 1.
H2. A voter’s choice to vote tactically, as measured by the inci-
dence of secondvote equaling 1, will depend on the anticipated 
outcomes in the nation as a whole and within the voter’s con-
stituency.
These macrolevel hypotheses describe how we expect the incidence of 
tactical voting to be distributed across the 2010 British electorate in the 
aggregate. Specifically, we expect that national- as well as constituency- 
level incentives will drive voters’ decisions to vote tactically, although as 
the rank- ordering of cells indicates, we anticipate fewer tactical votes as a 
consequence of national conditions than of local conditions.
Microlevel Hypotheses
For our macrolevel model of the aggregate levels of tactical voting across 
strategic contexts, we created ordinal rankings of voters’ preferences among 
the three major parties and expectations about their electoral chances. But 
the data provide more information than simple ordinal rankings. The 2010 
BES survey asked respondents to provide both types of measures on 11- 
point scales that we can treat as cardinal. We can then use these interval 
measures to create expected- utility variables and thus to test a microlevel 
model of individual decisions to vote tactically.
The theory of strategic voting implies that only some (indeed perhaps 
none) of those who prefer the trailing parties should vote tactically. For 
example, if voters like (or dislike) their second- and third- most- preferred 
parties roughly equally, that small difference would obviate the rationale 
for voting tactically. Or if a voter’s second- most- preferred party has just 
about the same chance of winning as the favorite party (as in a landslide 
being won by the least- preferred party), that vote would be wasted in either 
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case, and the voter could continue to vote for her favorite, if likely third- 
place- finishing, party. To put these and other similar comparisons together, 
voters will vote tactically only if the expected utility of voting for their 
second choice is larger than the expected utility of voting for their first- 
choice party.
We can put these informally discussed hypotheses together into a 
clearer form. Notationally, let p denote probability terms, b denote prefer-
ence terms (measured in cardinal utilities), and let subscripts 1, 2, and 3 
denote the parties in the order of voter preference. We are concerned with 
the expected utility of voting for Party 1 compared to that for voting for 
Party 2, and so on. Hence, we use the term p12 to represent the difference 
in the probability of Party 1 winning if the voter votes for that party and 
the probability of Party 2 winning if the voter votes instead for that party. A 
large value for p12 indicates an expectation that Party 1 is much more likely 
than Party 2 to win, ceteris paribus; a negative value implies an expectation 
that Party 2 will outperform Party 1. Similarly, b12 represents the differ-
ence in utility if Party 1 is elected and if Party 2 wins— it indicates just how 
much the voter prefers Party 1 to 2. Values for b12 will always be positive, 
but larger values indicate a stronger preference for Party 1, while values 
closer to 0 suggest more indifference between the parties. The full term, 
pb12, is the product of the expectation differential and the utility differential 
for Party 1 and Party 2.20 The variable pb13 is the analogous term expressing 
the product of the expectation and utility differentials of Party 1 and the 
least- preferred party, and pb23 is the comparison between the second- and 
third- most- preferred parties. With this notation, we can write the follow-
ing equation:
Pr(secondvote = 1) = f(pb12, pb13, pb23 ) (1)
Furthermore, we can derive the following hypotheses, where the variable 
to be explained is the probability of voting for the second- most- preferred 
party (or where secondvote equals 1):
H3. As pb12 increases, the chances of voting for the second- most- 
preferred party (Party 2) should decrease (that is, the incentives 
to vote tactically should decrease), whether that is because Party 
1 has an increasingly large chance of winning, because the voter 
has an increasingly strong preference for that party over the 
second- most- preferred party (Party 2), or both.21
42 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages
H4. As pb13 increases, the chances of voting for Party 2 should 
decrease (as the incentives to vote tactically should decrease), 
whether that is because Party 1 has an increasingly large chance 
of winning, because the voter has an increasingly strong prefer-
ence for that party over the least preferred party (Party 3), or 
both.
H5. As pb23 increases, the chance of voting for Party 2 should 
increase (and the incentives to vote tactically should increase), 
whether that is because Party 2 has an increasingly large chance 
of winning, because the voter has an increasingly strong prefer-
ence for Party 2 over Party 3, or both.
This microlevel model allows us to make predictions about the proba-
bility that individual respondents will vote for their second- most- preferred 
party. Specifically, the model predicts that voters will be most likely to devi-
ate from their sincere preferences when the theory of strategic voting sug-
gests that they have the strongest incentives to vote tactically.
Together, our models’ macro- and microlevel predictions for the 2010 
British election offer more precise expectations for the incidence and dis-
tribution of tactical voting than previous work examining the theory of 
strategic voting. The specifications of the microlevel models are, to a large 
extent, similar to those employed by those studying strategic voting in 
other elections (e.g., Abramson et al. 1992; Merolla and Stephenson 2007). 
The difference is that we compare estimates obtained when using voter 
assessments of both national- and constituency- level viabilities.
Results and Analysis
The percentage of voters who reported that they intended to vote for the 
party they liked the most varied considerably throughout the campaign. 
Figure 2.2 presents the topvote proportion over time for the electorate 
overall and for each party. The plot shows that in the early stages of the 
campaign, the Conservative Party was receiving the intended vote of a high 
proportion of its supporters, Labour was capturing a smaller proportion 
of the intended votes of its supporters, and the Lib Dems were receiving 
a much lower proportion of the intended votes of their supporters, just as 
the theory of strategic voting predicts given that the Lib Dems were in 
third place in most English constituencies. In other words, early on in the 
race strategic Conservative voters and Labour voters could vote straight-
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forwardly, while only Lib Dem voters faced any strategic incentives to vote 
tactically. This changed following the first televised debate, which featured 
a strong performance by Lib Dem prime ministerial candidate Nick Clegg. 
The consequence was a dramatic change in the strategic setting, making 
the Lib Dems a strategically viable choice in many districts. At the same 
time, Labour usually fell into a near tie or even into third place. As a further 
result, the Lib Dems began capturing more of the intended vote of their 
supporters. For the remainder of the campaign, the Conservatives contin-
ued their strong performance among their supporters, while Labour and 
the Lib Dems captured similar but lower proportions of the intended vote 
of their supporters.22 All of these findings are exactly what we would expect 
overall if voters were strategic. Of course, more precise information about 
individual constituencies will render a more exact reflection of the strategic 
context respondents to the BES faced in their respective districts.
Most respondents for whom we have data reported an intention to 
vote for their most preferred party (7,237 of 7,660, 94.5%). Of the 423 
respondents who reported an intention to deviate from their top choice, 
396 (93.6%; 5.1% of the total respondents) indicated that they would be 
voting for their second choice, while just 27 (6.4%; 0.35% of the total 
respondents) indicated an intention to vote for their third choice. Thus, 
most voters voted for their most preferred party (whether sincerely or stra-
tegically), while within the pool of possible tactical voters, the vast major-
ity were voting for their second- most- preferred party, as predicted by the 
theory of strategic voting.23
The second component of voters’ expected- utility calculations are their 
estimations of the efficacy of their votes— that is, the likelihood that it will 
affect the outcome. Like the vast majority of scholars who have studied 
this problem, we assume that this personal efficacy of an individual’s vote 
is closely related to and thus proxied by the perceived closeness of the 
contest: the closer the vote is expected to be in the nation or the constitu-
ency, the more likely that one vote will affect the outcome. The BES asked 
respondents to estimate the likelihood that each party would win their 
individual constituencies as well as the likelihood that each party would 
win the national election. We used these measures to estimate voters’ con-
stituency- and national- level expectations.24
Macrolevel Results
We first consider the evidence supporting the claims of the macrolevel 
model regarding aggregate levels of tactical voting across the different 
strategic contexts the voters faced. Table 2.2 fills in the cells of the three- 
Fig. 2.2. topvote Proportion by Party and by Date
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by- three table presented in table 2.1 using the actual observed proportion 
(and percentage) of respondents in each strategic context who reported an 
intention to vote for their second- choice party. The results in Table 2.2 
support H1 (the hypothesis that the incidence of tactical voting should fol-
low the rank- ordering of cells in table 2.1). Looking first at constituency- 
level incentives, we see that the incidence of tactical voting increased as 
expected— that is, tactical voting percentages increase across each row 
from minimal through moderate to the strongest incentives. Just 1.39% of 
voters who found themselves in the strategic context with minimal incen-
tives to vote tactically reported an intention to vote for their second- choice 
party.25 In contrast, 8.76% of those facing moderate incentives voted for 
their second- choice party, and 27.1% of those facing the strongest incen-
tives did so. The differences between these categories are statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, as predicted, voters’ decisions about voting tactically do 
appear to be based on their expectations regarding the outcome within 
their local constituency.
Table 2.2 also supports the hypothesis that voters’ strategic calculations 
were influenced by their national- level expectations. Voters in the strategic 
context with minimal national- level incentives to vote tactically did so just 
TABLE 2.2. Proportion and Percentage of Voters 
Reporting an Intention to Vote for Their Second- Choice 
Party, by Incentive Category
Constituency
Minimal
(1,2,3), 
(1,3,2), 
(3,1,2)
Moderate
(2,1,3)
Strongest
(2,3,1), 
(3,2,1)
Total
Minimal
(1,2,3), 
(1,3,2), 
(3,1,2)
13
1774 
(0.734%)
12
259 
(4.63%)
68
299 
(22.7%)
93
2332 
(3.99%)
Moderate
(2,1,3)
9
74
(12.2%)
10
82
(12.2%)
7
30
(23.3%)
26
186 
(14.0%)
Strongest
(2,3,1), 
(3,2,1)
7
232 
(3.02%)
17
104 
(16.3%)
47
122 
(38.5%)
71
458 
(15.5%)
N
at
io
na
l
Total 29
2080 
(1.39%)
39
445 
(8.76%)
122
451 
(27.1%)
190
2976 
(6.38%)
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3.99% of the time, while those facing moderate and the strongest such 
incentives did so 14.0% of the time and 15.5% of the time, respectively. 
The differences in proportion between minimal national incentives and 
both moderate and the strongest national incentives are statistically sig-
nificant. The differences in the incidence of secondvote among voters fac-
ing moderate and the strongest incentives is not statistically significant, 
although, as predicted, the rate of voting for the second- choice party was 
higher in the strongest incentive category than in the moderate category. 
The data thus support the inference that both constituency- and national- 
level expectations factored into voters’ decisions to vote tactically for their 
second- choice party.
Table 2.2 provides further evidence in support of H2 (tactical voting 
depends on the interaction between national and local strategic condi-
tions). Table 2.2 supports this interaction between the constituency- and 
national- level incentives and the incidence of secondvote across the nine dif-
ferent strategic contexts, and table 2.3 illustrates this phenomenon a bit 
more directly. It shows the ordering of the actual rate of tactical voting 
across these nine different contexts; that ordering can then be compared 
with the theoretical expectations set out in table 2.1. Of the nine different 
contexts, just one was out of order according to our theoretical expecta-
tions (the actual cell with the sixth- highest incidence of secondvote was asso-
ciated with the strategic context we expected to have the eighth- highest 
rate). Table 2.3 also reports for each cell— starting with the cell labeled 1 
at the bottom right— which cell next in the ordered ranking is the first to 
have a statistically significant different rate of secondvote. Thus although 
the difference between cells 1 and 2 is as expected, it is not statistically sig-
nificant; however, the difference between cells 1 and 3 is both as expected 
and statistically significant. Given the overall rate of tactical voting,26 the 
small number of respondents who fell into some of the various strategic 
contexts,27 and the fine grain of our theoretical predictions, table 2.3 offers 
strong support for the notion that tactical voting depends on both constit-
uency- and national- level incentives and the idea that constituency- level 
incentives tend to dominate strategic considerations regarding an inten-
tion to vote for a second- choice party. Moreover, the fact that most voters 
voting for their second- choice party were found in the strategic contexts 
with the highest incentives for tactical voting indicates that in the 2010 
British election, strategic considerations trumped any other voter moti-
vations for deviating from their most preferred parties, such as casting a 
protest vote or a bandwagon vote.28
A sharp decline occurred in the absolute number of respondents in each 
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category of increasingly favorable incentives for tactical voting. About 60% 
of all respondents fell into the cells where we expected that strategic voters 
would engage in nearly no tactical voting. Conversely, only 4% of respon-
dents faced a strategic context in which the incentives to vote tactically 
were the strongest. It is thus unsurprising that the overall percentage of 
those casting tactical votes is relatively low, even if every voter in Eng-
land reasoned strategically. The great majority faced the straightforward 
strategy of voting for their sincere (that is, most preferred) choice. The 
vast majority of voters perceived themselves as facing a strategic context 
offering relatively weak or even no incentives to vote tactically. Careful 
examination of the full data array indicates that the variation in tactical 
voting seems to result more from constituency- level factors than national 
factors (see Lanoue and Bowler 1998 for similar findings from Canada). 
This is a helpful observation because, while reasonable observers disagreed 
about the outcome expected nationally, the only “true” variation in national 
competitiveness was genuine (but relatively modest) variation over time 
in expectations about the election results. Conversely, considerable true 
variation occurred in competitiveness across the various constituencies.
Finally, the concentration of the highest proportion of tactical voting 
in the cells marked strongest also supports the idea that an interaction 
occurred between strategic considerations at local and national levels. As 
table 2.3 shows, tactical voting increased far greater than merely linearly 
TABLE 2.3. Actual Ordering of Incidence 
of secondvote (and Next- Ranked Cell with 
a Statistically Significant Different Level of 
secondvote)
Constituency
Minimal
(1,2,3), 
 (1,3,2),  
(3,1,2)
Moderate
(2,1,3)
Strongest
(2,3,1),  
(3,2,1)
Minimal
(1,2,3),  
(1,3,2),  
(3,1,2)
9
(N/A)
7
(9)
3
(5)
N
at
io
na
l
Moderate
(2,1,3)
6
(7)
5
(7)
2
(7)
Strongest
(2,3,1),  
(3,2,1)
8
(9)
4
(7)
1
(3)
48 The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages
and was especially high only when conditions were ripe for tactical voting 
at both levels. Thus, in addition to concluding that the local level provided 
the stronger context for strategic reasoning to induce tactical choices, we 
may also conclude that the strategic context’s support for tactical voting at 
both the local and national levels raised the incidence of reported tactical 
voting to quite high levels— that is, to where more than a third of such 
relevant respondents chose to vote tactically.
Microlevel Results
To test our microlevel model of individual tactical voting and the related 
hypotheses, H3– H5, we estimate a series of models of tactical voting using 
individuals’ expected- utility differentials.29 That is, we estimate a probit- 
regression form of equation 1 using the approach developed by Abramson 
et al. (1992). The right- side variables are the 2010 BES data on feeling ther-
mometers (for the b terms) and constituency- and national- level electoral 
expectations (for the p terms).30 The models include covariates measuring 
the strength of respondents’ reported partisan identification for the most 
preferred party (pid1, ranging from 0 to 3), a dummy variable indicating 
whether respondents were contacted by the most preferred party (contact1), 
and a dummy variable indicating whether respondents were contacted by 
the second- most- preferred party (contact2).31 The coefficient estimates for 
the pb variables provide the direct test of H3– H5.
We first estimated separate models for constituency- and national- level 
expectations. We then created two dummy variables, tactnat and tactcon, 
indicating whether the respondent voted in a strategic context— nationally 
and locally, respectively— that suggested tactical voting and ran two addi-
tional models including them. Table 2.4 presents the results.32 We pro-
ceeded in this fashion because of the high level of multicollinearity that 
led to explosive increases in standard errors of estimates and related signs 
of very high levels of multicollinearity (see the appendix to this chapter). 
Thus, the inclusion of tactnat and tactcon presents the only viable way of 
including the two levels in one model. It represents a sort of fixed effect 
for one level, allowing fuller tests of hypotheses of variables measured at 
the other level.
As expected, all four models found a negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between secondvote and the pb13 terms (supporting H4), 
and the coefficients appear to be large. Again as expected, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between secondvote and the pb23 terms 
(supporting H5) was estimated for the constituency- level measure, but the 
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counterpart at the national level was small, incorrectly signed, and not sig-
nificantly different from 0. Three of the four models estimate a negative 
relationship between secondvote and the pb12 terms (supporting H3). None 
of these estimated coefficients, however, is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. Thus, there is clear positive support for the overall microlevel 
model, but the results vary with respect to individual terms.33 In particular, 
there is greater (if not quite complete) support for the constituency- level 
measures than for the national- level measures, for which only the estimate 
coefficient for the pb13 term was large and statistically significant.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for tactnat in Model 
3 supports H1 and the idea that national- level incentives matter for tacti-
cal voting, even in the presence of and controlling for constituency incen-
tives (which supports H2).34 Thus the data from the 2010 BES suggest 
TABLE 2.4. Probit Regression Results
Probit Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −1.27* −1.19* −1.37* −1.76*
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15)
pb12con −0.09 0.43  
  (0.73) (0.93)  
pb13con −4.38* −4.64*  
  (0.38) (0.49)  
pb23con 5.14* 5.58*  
  (0.58) (0.72)  
pb12nat   −1.39 −0.19
    (0.84) (1.03)
pb13nat   −1.76* −1.86*
    (0.45) (0.57)
pb23nat   −0.23 −0.15
    (0.72) (0.93)
tactnat   0.27*  
    (0.10)  
tactcon   1.11*
    (0.11)
pid1 −0.32* −0.25* −0.28* −0.31*
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
contact1 −0.32* −0.58* −0.30* −0.31*
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
contact2 0.51* 0.71* 0.44* 0.46*
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
N 3,704 3,766 2,413 2,471
AIC 1270.78 1462.33 841.88 892.90
BIC 1,444.86 1,636.87 1,027.11 1,078.90
log L −607.39 −703.16 −388.94 −414.45
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * indicates significance at p < 0.05.
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that the behavior of the British electorate was consistent with our theory 
of strategic voting. To examine the nonlinear relationship between the 
independent variables and secondvote in our probit regression, figure 2.3 
illustrates a series of first- differences plots using Model 3. The plots show 
how the presence of national- level incentives to vote tactically affect the 
predicted values for secondvote over a range of values for a selected compo-
nent of the pbxy terms while holding all else constant.
35 We achieve this by 
simulating 1,000 times the predicted probability that a respondent would 
declare an intention to vote for Party 2 across specified values for the 
independent variables using the probit model.36 For example, figure 2.3(b) 
contains curves showing the relationship between pb13 and secondvote for 
voters with national- level incentives to vote tactically and for voters with-
out such incentives. Both curves show the theoretically expected negative 
relationship between pb13 and secondvote— as the expected utility from Party 
1 increases, the likelihood of voting for Party 2 declines. The predicted 
values for secondvote are lower for the range of pb13 when tactnat is 0, which 
Fig. 2.3. Predicted Probabilities Showing Effects of National- Level Incentives
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is also consistent with our expectations. Similarly, figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(c) 
each depict two curves— one with tactnat equal to 1 and one with tactnat 
equal to 0— showing the relationship between pb12 and pb23, respectively, 
and secondvote, holding all other variables constant. The upward slope of 
the curves for pb12 in figure 2.3(a) is contrary to our expectations but sta-
tistically insignificant, and it nevertheless shows the theoretically expected 
relationship between the existence of national- level incentives and likeli-
hood of voting for Party 2. Figure 2.3(c) conforms to all our expectations.
High collinearity led us to run separate estimations using the respon-
dents’ national- and constituency- level viability assessments. One reason 
this is not surprising is that one component of the pb terms, the respon-
dents’ evaluations of the parties, is the same across contexts. Nonetheless, 
we both assessed the predictions of our microlevel models and assessed 
whether improved predictability occurs when results from the model 
employing national viability assessments are considered.
We assessed the predictions of our microlevel models by comparing the 
predictions of the regressions with the actual results observed in our sam-
ple. To do so, we reconsidered table 2.2, our reporting of secondvote, sorted 
by strategic context. We repopulate the table cells using several methods: 
by performing a series of 100,000 draws of secondvote values from the full 
sample (excluding entries for which data were incomplete); by filling all 
cells with the mean value of secondvote (5.17%); by filling all cells with the 
modal value of secondvote (0); by filling the cells with the values predicted by 
the model using only constituency- level expectations (Model 1); by filling 
the cells with the values predicted by the model using only national- level 
expectations (Model 2); and by filling the cells with the values predicted by a 
model using both constituency- and national- level expectations (Model 3). 
We then calculated the root- mean- square error (RMSE) for each method 
compared with the actual results from table 2.2. Figure 2.4 presents the 
results. The plot shows the density plot of the RMSEs for the 100,000 
bootstrapped cells. The Average Deviation vertical line depicts the RMSE 
from using the mean value of secondvote to fill all cells. The No Deviation 
vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the modal value of secondvote 
for all cells. The Constituency Only vertical line depicts the RMSE from 
using the predictions from the model using only constituency- level expec-
tations. The National Only vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the 
predictions from the model using only national- level expectations. And the 
National + Constituency vertical line depicts the RMSE from using the 
predictions from the model using both constituency- and national- level 
expectations.
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Figure 2.4 shows that the predictions of all three models significantly 
outperform either null hypothesis (that is, either the mean or modal val-
ues of secondvote). Moreover, all three models outperform an overwhelming 
majority of the predicted probability tables generated by randomly per-
muted data. Among the three models, National + Constituency has the 
most predictive power. Both Constituency Only and National Only esti-
mates of tactical voting based on the strategic context help explain the vari-
ance in tactical voting. But the difference between Constituency Only and 
National Only confirms our earlier finding— consistent with our theory— 
that constituency- level incentives tend to drive the decision to vote tacti-
cally more than do national- level incentives.
Conclusion
Some observers argue that voters in a democratic society should reveal 
nothing but their true preferences in the voting booth. But voters value 
their votes and when the appropriate circumstances present themselves act 
in a way to make those votes consequential. That is, they engage in the 
same sort of trade- offs between policy and winning that torture practicing 
politicians. In every election under FPTP with many districts, voters will 
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have concerns about “wasting” their votes by casting a vote for a party with 
no chance of winning. The 2010 British election and the 2010 BES dataset 
present a rich and varied context in which to rigorously test fine- grained 
predictions derived from the theory of strategic voting. We find strong 
support for four of our five hypotheses, which together provide a quite 
precise explanation of how individuals’ decisions to vote tactically vary by 
strategic context.
Most English voters in the 2010 UK election faced a strategic context 
that allowed them to vote straightforwardly in accordance with their sin-
cere preferences. After all, the theory of tactical voting suggests that vot-
ers have incentives to strategically deviate from their top- choice candidate 
or party when they believe their second- choice option has a better chance 
of defeating their last- choice alternative. In the 2010 UK election, then, 
the phenomenon of tactical voting occurred infrequently among Conser-
vative voters, because their party typically ran first or second in the polls. 
Among Labour and Lib Dem voters, however, the strategic context more 
often suggested voting against the worst option than voting for the favorite 
option. Moreover, such voters took into account likely national outcomes 
in addition to the probable election results in the local constituency. Fully 
understanding the strategic context facing potential tactical voters in the 
2010 UK election requires looking at the relative preferences regarding the 
candidates and the relative expectations for the various candidates in both 
local and national races. The evidence presented here suggests that voters 
were aware of their electoral context and voted tactically (or not) in accor-
dance with the predictions of a rational- choice theory of strategic voting.
This chapter constitutes a novel attempt to tease out how national- 
and constituency- level expectations factor into strategic voting. By taking 
advantage of a very large dataset, we show that both constituency- and 
national- level expectations influence vote intentions and model voting 
behavior utilizing both constituency- and national- level expectations con-
sistent with the calculus of voting. Our models confirm that the combi-
nations of constituency- and national- level expectations and preferences 
predict whether or not voters intend to vote for their favorite party. We 
find evidence that although constituency- level viability estimates are more 
powerful, national- level expectations do drive decisions to vote tactically 
even in noncompetitive constituencies. Thus, empirical models that rely 
solely on constituency- level factors to explain tactical voting and estimate 
its effects on national elections (see, e.g., Kim and Fording 2001) may 
underestimate the frequency and impact of tactical voting. Similarly, stud-
ies seeking to estimate the effects of tactical voting on national results that 
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restrict their analyses to voters who expect their preferred party to fin-
ish third (and thereby exclude voters who expect that their favorite party 
will finish second behind their second- most- preferred party nationally or 
locally; [e.g., Kiewiet 2013]) may also be underestimating the effects of 
tactical voting.
As we hypothesized, respondents are most likely to vote for a party 
other than their most preferred when both national- and constituency- 
level expectations predict tactical voting because the favorite party is in last 
place. While constituency conditions outweighed national conditions in 
determining the casting of a tactical vote, as our theory implies and figure 
2.4 makes clear, both were shown to be significant and substantial forces in 
shaping strategic voting decisions. We also find tactical voting when only 
constituency expectations or national expectations predict such behavior, 
including when the favorite party is expected to finish second behind the 
second- most- preferred party.
The theory of strategic voting assumes that voters struggle with a diffi-
cult calculus in making voting decisions. To vote rationally and strategically, 
a voter needs to know the relative standing of the parties. Fluid national 
polls and highly variable constituency- level considerations complicate 
such calculations. Nevertheless, we found that tactical voting conformed 
to a variety of sometimes quite specific, testable hypotheses derived from 
rational- choice theory. Voters, like all other political actors, tend to make 
trade- offs based on rational calculations in their political best interests.
A P P E N D I X
This study presents evidence that constituency- and national- level con-
siderations influence voters’ strategic decisions regarding voting. Ideally, 
we would be able to show additional evidence for such interactions via our 
probit regressions. In fact, we ran several additional models that included 
terms to estimate the interactions between constituency- and national- 
level expectations. One such model simply interacted the various constitu-
ency and national pb terms; another interacted simply the constituency and 
national p terms; and a third interacted the constituency and national p 
terms, normalized across the various comparison pairs (12, 13, and 23).
The interactive terms did not add to our model’s explanatory power. 
Of the nine interactive terms tested across the three models, only one was 
statistically significant. The standard errors associated with the estimated 
coefficients for these interactive terms were quite high.
Not surprisingly, issues with multicollinearity appear to be to blame. 
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When we calculated the correlation coefficient between the variables 
included in our models, we found high values. These high correlations 
existed within our base model: the pb12 term for the constituency level was 
correlated with the corresponding national- level term at 0.471. The simi-
lar measures for the pb13 and pb23 terms were 0.384 and 0.290, respectively. 
And the correlations between the pb12 and pb13 terms were high (0.544 for 
the constituency term, 0.643 for the national term) because they incorpo-
rated much of the same information. This is an unavoidable artifact of our 
modeling approach as well as our data. The b terms we used for individu-
als were based on feeling thermometer scores for the various parties— the 
BES did not collect different scores for the particular candidates. And the 
respondents’ expectations regarding the outcomes in their local constitu-
encies and the national race also tended to be highly correlated.
But the correlations between the base pb terms and the interaction terms 
was even higher. For example, the interaction between the constituency- 
level pb12 term and the interactive pb12 term we created for the normalized 
model was 0.850, while the similar terms for pb13 and pb23 were 0.893 and 
0.881, respectively. These high correlations resulted in multicollinear-
ity issues that forced us to abandon our hopes of modeling interactions 
between constituency- and national- level incentives.
N O T E S
 1. A hung parliament is simply a case in which no one party wins a majority of 
seats in Commons and therefore can form the government on its own. Since World 
War II, no party has won a majority of the vote, but the leading party almost always 
sees its plurality of votes translated into a majority of seats. The 2010 election was 
one of those rare exceptions: the Conservatives held a large plurality of seats and 
formed a majority government by coalescing with the Lib Dems, who had finished 
third in votes and in seats.
 2. As Brennan and Hamlin (1998) show, what they call expressive voting is nei-
ther simple nor simple- minded. What this chapter calls strategic voting, they refer 
to as instrumental voting. They carefully consider the possibility that everyone 
might simultaneously have a mixture of instrumental and expressive considerations, 
and they outline models for that circumstance, much as Fiorina (1976) does (see 
chapter 1).
 3. Murr (2013, 15) finds that in UK elections between 1974 and 2005, if British 
citizens used even a randomly selected national campaign poll to predict the even-
tual winner of the election, then they would be correct at least 80% of the time.
 4. Kiewiet (2013), however, finds that many Labour voters responded to 
constituency- level signals to cast tactical votes for the Lib Dems from 1983 to 
2005.
 5. This is similar to what Reed (1990) found with respect to the slow develop-
ment of Duvergerian results in postwar Japan.
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 6. Most previous work on tactical voting asserted that it is restricted to support-
ers of parties that are expected to finish third out of three parties (see, e.g., Alvarez, 
Boehmke, and Nagler 2006; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), but Kselman and Niou 
(2010) demonstrate that voters have incentives to cast rationally tactical votes in 
some circumstances where the most preferred party is second to the second- most- 
preferred party (see also Blais and Nadeau 1996, which looks at tactical voting 
among voters whose second- most- preferred party has a higher expectation of win-
ning than their most preferred party).
 7. That is, voters perceive their chances of being pivotal in the nation as the 
chances of being pivotal in selecting the local candidate and the chances that that 
winning candidate is pivotal in the parliament in terms of government formation.
 8. These scholars assume that the voters have some knowledge about the close-
ness of the race in their constituency, but the scholars can only observe incumbency, 
a variable that makes a great deal of difference in the chances of a nonincumbent 
party winning that seat.
 9. We assume that there is a normally distributed variance in estimation, as 
reported by the “how close” measure. Obviously, if we had available complete sub-
jective probability distributions, we could exploit a more fully developed treatment 
of the assumed stochastic term.
 10. This chapter employs data from the 2010 “rolling cross- sectional” Campaign 
Internet Panel Survey (CIPS) wave of the 2010 BES. After completing a precam-
paign survey over the Internet, respondents were asked to complete the CIPS at a 
randomly selected time so that representative subsamples of the panel responded 
on each day of the campaign. Respondents were then asked to complete a follow- up 
survey after the election. CIPS had a total sample size of 14,973, and respondents to 
the internet waves of the BES are randomly selected from YouGov’s pool of more 
than 350,000 Britons. The survey firm employs complex recruitment techniques, 
matching methods, and weighting procedures to produce representative samples of 
target populations. On the similarity of results obtained via this and probability- 
based sampling methods for the 2005 BES, see Sanders et al. 2007.
 11. We excluded respondents who expressed a vote intention for a party other 
than the three national parties because the BES did not include feeling thermome-
ters for smaller parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party or British 
Independence Party. The survey did include feeling thermometers for the Scottish 
National Party and Plaid Cymru, but we excluded non- English respondents from 
our analyses because of the unique regional effects of these two parties.
 12. Some respondents reported the same feeling thermometer scores for differ-
ent parties (i.e., ties). With only 11 unique scores to assign with the feeling ther-
mometers and at least three parties to score, respondents might tie two parties even 
if they had a slight preference for one over the other. When a respondent reported 
an intention to vote for one of the tied parties, we used that vote intention to break 
the tie. In all other cases, the ties remained. This is a conservative procedure in that 
ties were broken, if at all, in a direction that limits the extent of tactical voting at 
least as observed in the data.
 13. Of course, voters may deviate from their true preferences for reasons other 
than tactical voting, and just because voters cast a vote for their top choice does not 
mean they are not behaving strategically.
Revised Pages
 Effect of Expectations on Tactical Voting in the British General Election 57
 14. Less than 0.40% of respondents (27 out of 6,791) indicated an intention to 
vote for their third- favorite party.
 15. Among the 396 voters voting for their second- favorite party, 170 said they 
“really prefer[red] another party” and 73 said they “vote[d] tactically.” Among the 
remaining such voters, 67 said “the party has the best policies,” 32 said “the party 
has the best leader,” and 54 cited “other reasons.”
 16. This difference is statistically significant with a two- tailed p- value of less 
than 0.0002. The 95% confidence interval around the difference in percentages of 
51.6% is 46.6% to 56.5%.
 17. While two voters may face the same strategic context of, say, 1,2,3, which 
party is designated 1— that is, the most preferred— can differ from voter to voter. 
Further, the expectation gap between the first- and second- place parties may dif-
fer considerably from voter to voter. But for this macro model, we are concerned 
only with ordinal rankings. The cardinal expectation (and preference) scores will be 
considered in the micro model.
 18. Those six orderings are (1,2,3), (1,3,2), (2,1,3), (2,3,1), (3,1,2), and (3,2,1).
 19. Casting a decisive vote in the nation means that the voter cast a decisive vote 
in the district and that the candidate who thereby won became the MP whose seat 
transformed his/her party into a majority within the Commons.
 20. Thus pb12 = (p1 − p2)*(b1 − b2).
 21. More technically, it is increasing not in probabilities of a party winning but of 
a vote being pivotal in creating a winner. These two probabilities will be the same 
(we assume) as the probability of winning increases from 0 to 0.5. Since virtually no 
one believed any party had a probability of winning greater than 0.5 in this election 
(at least when constraining probabilities to sum to one), the two probabilities are 
purely monotonically increasing in each other, so we use the simpler (and empiri-
cally available) measure of the probability of a party winning the election.
 22. Given that the BES interviewed across the full campaign period, these 
changes indicate that prospective voters faced changing national conditions, which 
means that true changes in expectations occurred over that time. This empirical 
variation provides us with unusual leverage. In addition, the BES interviews were 
done to reflect a (small) random sample of the respondents each day.
 23. In specifying our independent variables, we follow Abramson et al. 1992 and 
develop measures of tactical voting derived from measures of respondents’ reported 
feelings about the national parties and their expectations regarding the electoral 
performance of the parties. However, the BES did ask a more direct question about 
voters’ motivations for casting their ballots. Among English voters, 5.1% stated 
they had “voted tactically,” and another 7.4% reported voting the way they did 
because their truly preferred party had “no chance of winning.” On the similarities 
and differences in the conclusions about tactical voting with the direct and indirect 
measurement, see Blais, Young, and Turcotte 2005.
 24. The 2010 BES includes data on the respondents’ constituencies, including 
the breakdown of the vote. Media lists of battleground constituencies drawn during 
the 2010 campaign closely correspond to the constituencies that had the smallest 
winning margins in 2005. See, e.g., http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/
results/
 25. Kselman and Niou (2010) argue that no tactical voting can occur in such 
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cells and that any secondvotes in such cells must result from other reasons, such as a 
protest vote or a bandwagon vote. Given our relaxation of the perfect knowledge 
of probabilities assumption regarding voters’ estimates of the parties’ chances, our 
theory, in contrast, permits some (albeit very little) tactical voting within such stra-
tegic contexts.
 26. In cells with the highest incentives for and incidence of tactical voting, 
we observed nearly 40% of respondents reporting an intention to vote for their 
second- choice party.
 27. Of the 2,976 respondents for whom data are reported in table 2.2, 1,774 
(59.6%) were within a strategic context that provided minimal incentives at both 
the constituency and national levels to vote tactically, while just 4.10% were within 
a strategic context that provided the strongest incentives from constituency- and 
national- level considerations.
 28. Of course there were additional (and new) parties (e.g., the United King-
dom Independence Party) that could have attracted protest votes that the three 
long- standing UK parties did not. United Kingdom Independence Party, which 
was sparked when Nigel Farage took over as its leader in 2009, continued to influ-
ence British politics at least through the Brexit vote, after which Farage resigned as 
leader, leaving the party’s future uncertain.
 29. That is, we estimate a model explaining secondvote as a function of pb12, pb13, 
and pb23 where pbxy is equal to
(px − py)*(bx − by)
 30. Kselman and Niou argue that models of tactical voting that include voters 
who face no incentives to vote tactically are misspecified, but because our model 
estimates both straightforward and tactical strategic voting, we model all voters, 
not just those who face some incentive to vote tactically.
 31. Other covariates considered but rejected for failing to improve model fit 
include measures of attention to the 2010 campaign, education level, income, and 
reported feelings of political efficacy.
 32. These models were estimated using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 
2012) in the R computer language (R Core Team 2012).
 33. The set of pb variables collectively is statistically significant.
 34. Of course, the very large and statistically significant coefficient for tactcon in 
Model 4 further supports H2.
 35. Because the various pbxy terms contain the same components (e.g., both pb12 
and pb13 have as components p1 and b1), we had to construct specific scenarios to 
illustrate the effects of only one of the pbxy terms. To create the plot showing the 
effects of varying pb12, we varied b1, the feeling- thermometer score for Party 1, and 
left constant p1, the expectation that Party 1 will win. But to eliminate any effects 
of pb13, we set p1 equal to p3. We followed an analogous procedure for the other two 
plots, varying b1 and setting p1 equal to p2 to show the effect of pb13 and varying b2 
and setting p1 equal to p2 to show the effect of pb23.
 36. The range of these 1,000 simulated plots provides an illustration of the con-
fidence intervals of our estimates. We present the 90% confidence interval around 
our estimates.
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